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I. INTRODUCTION

Judicial opinions analyzing civil procedure issues are unlikely sources
of rich imagery. Recent legal scholarship on metaphor has focused on
sexier areas of the law, such as constitutional interpretation1 or the
∗ Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. The author would like to thank Professor
Ben Means of the University of South Carolina for his extremely helpful comments on an early
draft of this Article.
1. See, e.g., STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST 266–73 (2001) (analyzing the
roots and implications of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s “marketplace of ideas” metaphor in First
Amendment jurisprudence); see generally, e.g., Scott Dodson, A Darwinist View of the Living
Constitution, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1319 (2008) (exploring the metaphor of a living Constitution and
its implications from a biological perspective); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as
Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998) (promoting the
metaphor of a market for partisan control as a useful tool with which to analyze Constitutional
boundaries of state regulation of democratic politics); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property Metaphors
and Kelo v. New London: Two Views of the Castle, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2971 (2006) (critiquing
the home-as-castle metaphor as a force galvanizing public opposition to the Supreme Court’s 2005
takings clause decision); Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO.
L.J. 181 (2004) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s use of fire as a metaphor and motif in its free
expression decisions).
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regulation of new technologies.2 Nevertheless, beneath the superficially
arid terrain of civil procedure opinions run streams of metaphor that reveal
anxieties, fears, and resentments regarding the litigation process and that
propagate a specific characterization of that process. These metaphors may
be so subtle as to go unnoticed.
This Article notices and examines the metaphoric content and the
frame-shifting technique of a far-reaching procedural opinion from the
Supreme Court’s most recent term, Ashcroft v. Iqbal.3 That case, which
builds upon the Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,4
has increased the required specificity with which plaintiffs must plead their
cases in order to avoid early dismissal. Both cases increased this
requirement by subjecting the factual allegations of a complaint to a new
and amorphous “plausibility” standard.5 While these rather technical cases
drew little media attention, they have profoundly affected arguments
regarding access to justice in civil cases.6 Both decisions, but especially
Iqbal, place plaintiffs in a Catch-22. In order to enter the discovery phase
of the litigation process, where litigants may use the power of the court to
gain access to evidence in an opponent’s possession, plaintiffs must now
state their claims in more factual detail than before. Often, however,
plaintiffs cannot allege detailed facts until they gain access to detailed
evidence through the discovery process.
Other scholarship has wrestled with the substantive implications of
these recent decisions.7 This Article focuses instead on how the current
2. See generally, e.g., Robert C. Cumbow, Cyberspace Must Exceed Its Grasp, or What’s a
Metaphor? Tropes, Trips and Stumbles on the Info Highway, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 665 (1997)
(analyzing judicial use of metaphors in decisions concerning applicability of copyright doctrine to
internet content); Stephanie A. Gore, “A Rose by Any Other Name”: Judicial Use of Metaphors for
New Technologies, 2003 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 403 (criticizing judicial use of inapposite metaphors in
technology cases and suggesting more appropriate metaphors).
3. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
4. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
5. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (noting that complaint must contain “plausible grounds” to
allow court to infer elements of plaintiff’s claim); Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (“We next consider the
factual allegations in respondent’s complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief.”).
6. A Westlaw search conducted on April 2, 2010, indicated that Twombly had been cited in
over 26,000 subsequent judicial opinions and that Iqbal had been cited in over 7,100 opinions.
7. See generally, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010) [hereinafter Bone, Plausibility
Pleading Revisited] (criticizing Iqbal as an ill-advised expansion of Twombly); Robert G. Bone,
Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873 (2009)
[hereinafter Bone, Regulation of Court Access] (evaluating the costs and benefits of screening
meritless suits at the pleading stage); Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern
American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109 (2009) (critiquing Twombly and Iqbal); Scott Dodson,
Essay, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135
(2007) (analyzing the implications of Twombly); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49
B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008) (critiquing Twombly); Saritha Komatireddy Tice, A “Plausible”
Explanation of Pleading Standards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 827, 830 (2008) (discussing the significance of Twombly). For a review
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Court has used frame-shifting and metaphor to achieve such sweeping
change with so little apparent effort. Through a close reading of Iqbal, I
identify two crucial moves. First, through its use of the word “entitlement”
and related terms, the Court adopts a new frame of reference by
emphasizing the plaintiff’s lack of entitlement to proceed to discovery,
rather than the defendant’s lack of entitlement to receive detailed
allegations at the pleading stage. Second, by drawing on a metaphor of
judging-as-measuring, the Court invests its new plausibility test with the
appearance of objective consistency, and in so doing, deflects attention
from the unbounded discretion that the opinion grants to judges who will
administer that test from now on in the lower courts.
Part II of this Article places Iqbal in its historical doctrinal context by
describing the change to federal pleading standards brought about by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and the Supreme Court’s recent
tightening of those standards. Part III then critiques Iqbal’s pleadings
analysis through a close reading of the majority opinion in the case,
focusing on the Court’s frame-shifting use of the word “entitlement” and
on the judging-as-weighing metaphor used by the majority to justify its
application of the plausibility test. Part IV draws briefly upon recent
research in cognitive psychology and on theories of metaphor to explain
both the power of frame-shifting and metaphorical techniques and also the
necessity of identifying and critiquing their use in judicial opinions.
II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER IQBAL
A. Pleading Standards from the Advent of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to 2007
The most recent large-scale reform in federal pleading occurred in
1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective. Charles
E. Clark, the chief architect of the Federal Rules, intended to simplify and
streamline the pleading process by re-emphasizing the notice-giving
function of pleadings and by doing away with the perceived necessity of
pleading detailed facts.8 Indeed, the system established by Rule 8(a)(2) has
of scholarly commentary on Twombly, see Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with
Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power Over
Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1234–38 (2008).
8. Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 316 (1938)
(explaining that under the Federal Rules, pleadings serve primarily the modest function of stating
allegations sufficient to “isolate [the action] from all others, so that the parties and the court will
know what is the matter in dispute,” rather than describing parties’ evidence in detail). The code
pleading system, in effect before the promulgation of the Federal Rules, had required the pleading
of “facts.” See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 150 (1928). While
this system did not explicitly require detailed factual allegations, some courts required a relatively
high level of technical detail, and litigants risked having pleadings dismissed if courts considered
their assertions to be general legal conclusions rather than specific factual allegations. See id. at
150–55 (describing the difficulty, under code pleading, of distinguishing among factual,
evidentiary, and legal assertions and noting specific instances of pleadings dismissed as asserting
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come to be known—for better or worse—as “notice pleading.”9 The
Federal Rules pleading system allows courts to screen out legally
insufficient claims at the pleading stage, but it leaves screening based on
the factual merits to the discovery phase through summary judgment. Thus,
Rule 8(a)(2) requires merely that a pleading set forth “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”10 The
Rule 8(a)(2) standard represents a policy choice to minimize the risk that
meritorious cases will be prematurely dismissed at the pleading stage—a
stage at which plaintiffs may lack access to detailed evidence.11 This
policy, of course, carries some cost. Specifically, a low threshold for
stating a claim in the pleadings means that more cases will proceed to the
often costly and lengthy discovery phase. Some actions making it to the
discovery phase will turn out to be non-meritorious based on the evidence,
but even if such actions are disposed of through summary judgment,
defending parties will already have invested significant time, money, and
energy litigating to that point.
In 1957, the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson12 explicitly interpreted
Rule 8(a)(2) in terms of this low notice-pleading threshold. Justice Hugo
Black’s opinion noted that “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his
claim” but instead require only that a complaint give “the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.”13 In an earlier paragraph, the opinion had used the following
language to begin its analysis of whether the complaint at issue had stated a
claim:
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of
course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
merely general legal conclusions); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 252–53 (4th ed. 2005) (summarizing the spread of code-pleading systems and
their replacement, in the federal courts and most state courts, with Rules-based systems requiring
less detail in pleadings); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2004) (“Federal civil pleadings differ from the ‘fact pleading’ of the
codes principally in the degree of generality with which the elements of the claim may be stated.”).
9. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, at § 1202 (noting that the label may exaggerate the
generality allowed by Rule 8 but conceding that it is too late to remove the term from common
parlance).
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
11. See RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 302 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining that the Rules
drafters intended to “lower the formal barrier . . . to entering the litigation stream” because “the
plaintiff is not in a position to plead much detail at the outset of litigation”); CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 477 (6th ed. 2002) (noting that the
“fundamental notion of all modern procedural reform” is that the object of procedure is to secure
“determination on the merits rather than to penalize litigants because of procedural blunders”).
12. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
13. Id. at 47.
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his claim which would entitle him to relief. Here, the
complaint alleged, in part, that petitioners were discharged
wrongfully by the Railroad and that the Union, acting
according to plan, refused to protect their jobs as it did those
of white employees or to help them with their grievances all
because they were Negroes. If these allegations are proven[,]
there has been a manifest breach of the Union’s statutory duty
to represent fairly and without hostile discrimination all of the
employees in the bargaining unit.14
If taken literally, the first sentence above, with its reference to “no set of
facts,” would mean that a complaint that alleges only the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s names should not be dismissed as insufficient, because it does
not negate the possibility that the plaintiff could prove some set of
unmentioned facts that would legally entitle him or her to relief from the
defendant.15 Naturally, the lower courts did not adopt such a literal
interpretation.16 A more reasonable reading of this language takes into
account its context, including the description of the allegations at issue in
Conley and Justice Black’s later reference to the need to give fair notice to
the defendant of the claim and grounds. Presumably, the “no set of facts”
assertion was intended to mean that if a complaint contains sufficient
allegations to provide fair notice of the conduct and harm at issue, for
which the law provides a remedy, and if the complaint contains no
allegations that would negate an element of the claim as a matter of law,
then a court must hold that the complaint has stated a legally sufficient
claim for purposes of Rule 8(a)(2).
While the “no set of facts” language was not a model of clarity, the
general consensus in the fifty years following Conley was that if a
complaint gave fair notice of the events giving rise to a cognizable claim, it
met the Rule 8(a)(2) standard, and that fair notice did not require
particularity and detail.17 The authoritative Wright and Miller treatise, in
2004, summed up the standard as follows:
The rule requires the pleader to disclose adequate information
regarding the basis of his claim for relief as distinguished
14. Id. at 45–46 (footnote omitted).
15. Indeed, as Professor Richard Marcus has noted, “How can a court ever be certain that a
plaintiff will prove no set of facts entitling him to relief?” Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact
Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 434 (1986)
(emphasis added).
16. See Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Although the
exceedingly forgiving attitude toward pleading deficiencies that was expressed by Justice Black for
the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson . . . continues to be quoted with approval[,] . . . it has
never been taken literally.”) (citation omitted).
17. See, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 8, at 268 (“What the pleader need
not do is allege a specific fact to cover every element or identify the theory of recovery. As long as
the opposing party and the court can obtain a basic understanding of the claim being made, the
requirements are satisfied.”) (footnotes omitted).
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from a bare averment that he wants relief and is entitled to it.
Undoubtedly great generality in the statement of these
circumstances can be permitted so long as defendant is given
fair notice of what is being asserted against him.18
Thus, notice pleading after Conley focused on the defendant’s lack of
entitlement to detailed allegations at the pleading stage. Rule 8(a)(2)
entitled defendants to nothing more than fair notice.
Certainly, Rule 9(b)’s “particularity” standard, which applies only to
pleadings alleging fraud or mistake, stood in sharp contrast to the general
understanding of the Rule 8(a)(2) standard.19 Consequently, the Supreme
Court warned courts against requiring particularly detailed pleadings in
cases governed by Rule 8(a)(2) rather than by Rule 9(b). For example, in
Leatherman v. Tarrant County,20 a unanimous Court struck down what it
deemed to be a heightened pleading requirement developed by the Fifth
Circuit in a § 1983 action against two municipalities. Fifth Circuit
precedent had required that such claims be stated “with factual detail and
particularity.”21 In Leatherman, Justice William Rehnquist noted that
§ 1983 claims were not among those subject to heightened pleading under
9(b), and that, therefore, “litigants must rely on summary judgment and
control of discovery,” rather than on high pleading standards, “to weed out
unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later.”22 Similarly, in Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A.,23 the Supreme Court held that in an employment
discrimination action whose pleadings were governed by Rule 8(a)(2), a
complaint states a claim when it alleges generally that the plaintiff was
terminated because of his race and national origin and includes some
information regarding the dates and persons involved in the
decisionmaking process. Even though precedent did—and still does—
require that plaintiffs in such cases eventually prove specific circumstances
giving rise to an inference of discrimination,24 the Court held that their
complaints need not plead such circumstances in any detail because the
substantive precedent sets forth “an evidentiary standard, not a pleading
requirement.”25 In the absence of a statute or Rule imposing a higher
pleading standard in this context, defendants must use “liberal discovery
rules and summary judgment motions” to combat non-meritorious
claims.26
Thus, on the eve of the Supreme Court’s 2007 Twombly decision,
federal pleading standards were a fairly straightforward matter in first-year
18. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, at § 1202 (footnote omitted).
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (requiring that allegations of fraud or mistake be stated “with
particularity”).
20. 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993).
21. Id. at 167 (quoting Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir. 1985)).
22. Id. at 168–69.
23. 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).
24. See id. at 510 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 512.
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civil procedure courses around the country: the professor covered the
lowering of the pleading threshold brought about by the advent of the
Federal Rules, the Supreme Court’s explanation of notice pleading in cases
like Conley, the Court’s applications of the notice-pleading standard in
cases such as Swierkiewicz, and the Rule 9(b) exception to 8(a)(2)’s
general standard—before marching through discovery and other topics in
the casebook.
B. Twombly and Plausibility
The pleadings leg of the civil procedure march became substantially
rockier after the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly.27 According to the leading treatise, the Twombly majority
“articulated what appears to be a new ‘plausibility standard’ by which
pleadings should be judged.”28 The plaintiffs in Twombly represented a
massive putative class of consumers of local phone and internet services.29
They alleged that their regional providers had agreed not to compete for
business in each other’s territories, thereby keeping rates artificially high
and violating federal antitrust laws.30 The consumer-plaintiffs believed an
agreement was evident from the fact that each service provider had chosen
to do business only in its own region—i.e., that the providers were
engaging in “‘parallel’” rather than competitive conduct.31 In their
complaint, the consumers described the nature of this parallel conduct and
alleged generally that the providers had agreed not to enter into each
other’s regional markets.32
In holding that the general allegation of an agreement failed to state a
claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Supreme Court, with Justice
David Souter writing for a seven-Justice majority, noted that parallel
conduct was a common phenomenon in business, even in the absence of
illegal agreements.33 The Court therefore concluded that the allegations of
parallel conduct failed to render the general allegation of an illegal
agreement plausible,34 and without a plausible allegation of an agreement,
the complaint could not meet the Rule 8(a)(2) standard:
27. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
28. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, at § 1202 (Supp. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
560).
29. 550 U.S. at 550.
30. Id. at 550–51. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant-service providers conspired to
prevent new competitors from entering the defendants’ existing service areas. Id.
31. Id. at 551 (quoting Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 51, Twombly v.
Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 Civ. 10220), 2003 WL
25629874).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 553–54 (referring to conscious parallel conduct as “a common reaction of ‘firms in
a concentrated market [that] recognize[e] their shared economic interests and their interdependence
with respect to price and output decisions’” (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993))).
34. Id. at 564 (“When we look for plausibility in this complaint, we agree with the District
Court that plaintiffs’ claim of conspiracy in restraint of trade comes up short.”).
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The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly
suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the
threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the “plain
statement” possess enough heft to “sho[w] that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” A statement of parallel conduct . . . needs
some setting suggesting the agreement . . . . An allegation of
parallel conduct . . . gets the complaint close to stating a
claim, but without some further factual enhancement it stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
“entitle[ment] to relief.”35
The Court suggested that allegations setting forth the specific time, place,
and persons involved in the supposed agreement would render the
existence of an agreement plausible and thus allow the complaint to meet
the Rule 8(a)(2) standard.36 But of course, even if an illegal agreement had
occurred, the plaintiffs had no access to such details at the pleading stage.
The plaintiffs had argued that their general allegation of an agreement
sufficed at the pleading stage because, under Conley v. Gibson, “a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”37 In response, the Supreme
Court noted that this passage from Conley was not to be taken literally and
cited several lower court opinions that had “questioned, criticized, and
explained [it] away.”38 In the end, the Court announced that “after puzzling
the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its
retirement.”39
In an attempt to pre-empt criticism that Twombly’s plausibility test
would allow courts to find facts at the pleading stage, Justice Souter’s
majority opinion explained that “[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer an
agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage;
it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”40 The opinion also
pointed to “the potentially enormous expense of discovery” as a reason to
impose a plausibility standard at the pleading stage.41 Justice John Paul
Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in dissent, bemoaned the
majority’s “dramatic departure from settled procedural law,”42 opining that
the majority’s “‘plausibility’ standard is irreconcilable with Rule 8 and
with our governing precedents”—including Swierkiewicz and
Leatherman.43
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 557 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
Id. at 564 n.10.
Id. at 561 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)).
Id. at 562.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 586.
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Academic criticism of the Twombly decision was speedy and abundant.
As a general matter, critics charged that Twombly imposed an
impermissibly higher pleading standard that would restrict access to justice
in a class of meritorious civil cases.44 Others debated questions that
Twombly appeared to leave open, such as whether the decision was limited
to the antitrust context or to the context of large, complex cases.45 Still
others raised concerns as to where Twombly now set the bar for pleading
other types of claims—especially discrimination claims.46 In sum, as the
Second Circuit noted in 2007, the Supreme Court in Twombly had created
“[c]onsiderable uncertainty concerning the standard for assessing the
44. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 7, at 139 (“[T]he Court’s standard is likely to bar many
antitrust cases (and mass tort, discrimination, and a host of other cases) with merit.”); Randal C.
Picker, Twombly, Leegin, and the Reshaping of Antitrust, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 177 (“Twombly
shrinks the domain of private plaintiffs and it does so without even a passing thought about what
that will do to the overall level of antitrust enforcement.”); Robert E. Shapiro, Advance Sheet:
Requiescat in Pace, 34 LITIG., Fall 2007, at 67, 67 (“Now, there can be no real quibbling that
Justice Stevens was right, that the Court majority was suddenly veering away from the old rules of
notice pleading.”); Spencer, supra note 7, at 433 (opining that Twombly’s plausibility standard is
“an unwarranted interpretation of Rule 8 that will frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs with valid claims
to get into court”); Tice, supra note 7, at 830 (“The Court’s decision in Twombly . . . . solidifies
what has been a growing hostility toward litigation.”). Professor Stephen Burbank, with the benefit
of two years of hindsight, commented in 2009 that to the extent Justice Souter and others in the
Twombly majority did not view their decision as “a change in pleading standards that could
fundamentally alter the role of litigation in American society,” their belief was “understandable but,
at least in retrospect, naïve.” Burbank, supra note 7, at 114. A few commentators have argued that
Twombly was consistent—or not very inconsistent—with precedent. See, e.g., Bone, Regulation of
Court Access, supra note 7, at 883 (stating that Twombly does not “substantially tighten[] pleading
requirements” and represents only a “modest” move away from traditional notice pleading);
Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1064–65 (2009) (arguing that
the requirements of Twombly’s plausibility rule were “mandated by the Federal Rules” and form “an
appropriate and necessary standard”). For a helpful summary of commentary on Twombly as of
2008, see Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1234–38.
45. Compare Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 120–21 (2007) (indicating that the Twombly
plausibility rule is limited to antitrust cases), with Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About
Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1814–15 (2008) (describing results of an empirical study indicating
lower courts have applied the plausibility standard across many substantive areas), Joseph A.
Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment
Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1024–25 (stating that the question whether the
plausibility standard applied to all types of claims had “no easy answer” but suggesting that such
applicability was likely), and Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We “Notice”
Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 893, 910–13 (2008) (opining that a limitation of
Twombly to antitrust claims or to complex cases was unlikely).
46. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 7, at 117 (predicting that “[e]mployment discrimination
cases are one category likely to suffer at the hands of district judges implementing a contextual
‘plausibility’ regime” under Twombly); Hannon, supra note 45, at 1815 (reporting on an empirical
study indicating that “[t]he rate of dismissal in civil rights cases has spiked in the four months since
Twombly”); Seiner, supra note 45, at 1035–41 (surveying lower courts’ applications of the
Twombly standard to employment discrimination claims).
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adequacy of pleadings.”47
C. Iqbal
Against this backdrop, a civil rights case brought by Javaid Iqbal was
percolating through the federal court system. As a result of post-September
11th terrorism investigations, the federal government had identified over
one hundred persons “of high interest,” and this group included Iqbal, a
Pakistani Muslim living in the United States.48 Iqbal’s Bivens complaint49
alleged that this designation led to his detention at a maximum security
facility where, he further alleged, guards brutally beat him and denied him
the opportunity to engage in daily prayer and religious study.50 His
complaint named as defendants his prison guards and wardens, but most
significantly, it also named then-Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI
Director Robert Mueller.51 Paragraph sixty-nine of Iqbal’s complaint
alleged that the “‘policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in
highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were “cleared” by
the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in
discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.’”52 Paragraph ninetysix alleged that these two defendants “‘each knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject’” Iqbal to the harsh conditions
of confinement “‘as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion,
race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.’”53
The complaint labeled Ashcroft the “principal architect” of this policy and
alleged that Mueller was “instrumental in [the policy’s] adoption,
promulgation, and implementation.”54
Ashcroft and Mueller moved in the district court for dismissal of the
claims against them, arguing that their qualified immunity required the
complaint to show their personal involvement in constitutional violations
and that Iqbal’s allegations failed to do so.55 The court denied their motion,
pointing to the above allegations and citing the “no set of facts” language
from Conley v. Gibson.56 While the Second Circuit was considering
Ashcroft and Mueller’s interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court issued its
47. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937 (2009).
48. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943.
49. Named for Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Narcotics Bureau, 403 U.S.
388 (1971), a Bivens complaint alleges a constitutional violation on the part of federal agents and
seeks monetary damages.
50. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing First Amended Complaint and
Jury Demand).
51. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 1–2, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV01809, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), 2004 WL 3756442.
52. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944 (quoting First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra
note 51, at 13–14).
53. Id. (quoting First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 51, at 17–18).
54. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 51, at 4–5.
55. See Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *20.
56. Id. at *11.
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decision in Twombly, which lay to rest Conley’s “no set of facts” language
and imposed the plausibility standard on pleadings.57 Applying Twombly,
the Second Circuit held that the complaint sufficiently alleged Ashcroft’s
and Mueller’s personal involvement in allegedly discriminatory policy
decisions.58
In May 2009, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a five-justice
majority of the Supreme Court, reversed the Second Circuit and held that
Iqbal had failed to state a claim against Ashcroft and Mueller under Rule
8(a)(2).59 First, the Court held that because Ashcroft and Mueller were
subject to qualified immunity, Iqbal was required to plead his claims
against them with “sufficient factual matter to show that [they] adopted
and implemented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral,
investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating on account of
race, religion, or national origin.”60
Next, the majority explained that it need not accept “legal conclusions”
in the complaint as true for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.61 The
majority then identified the particular allegations it deemed to be legal
conclusions. These included paragraphs alleging that Ashcroft and Mueller
“‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed’” to subject
Iqbal to harsh conditions of confinement “‘as a matter of policy, solely on
account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin’”; that Ashcroft was
the “‘principal architect’” of this discriminatory policy; and that Mueller
was “‘instrumental’” in the policy’s adoption and execution.62 The
remaining allegations, which were entitled to be taken as true, stated
nothing about a discriminatory motive on the Ashcroft’s and Mueller’s
parts; instead, they noted principally that Mueller’s FBI detained thousands
of Arab Muslim men after September 11th and that Ashcroft and Mueller
had discussed and approved a policy of holding high-interest detainees in
highly restrictive conditions.63
Lastly, the Supreme Court majority engaged in a Twombly-style
analysis, considering whether these remaining allegations “plausibly”
showed that Ashcroft and Mueller had “purposefully adopted a policy of
classifying post-September-11 detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of
their race, religion, or national origin.”64 Of course, because the Court had
57. See supra notes 33–39 and accompanying text.
58. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 174–76 (2d Cir. 2007).
59. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009).
60. Id. at 1948–49. Justice Souter, in dissent, disputed the majority opinion on this point by
arguing that Ashcroft and Mueller had earlier conceded that a weaker standard applied; specifically,
Justice Souter pointed to Ashcroft and Mueller’s petition for certiorari, in which they had indicated
that officials in their position could be liable merely for exhibiting “deliberate indifference” to the
known discriminatory conduct of their subordinates. Id. at 1956 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
Petition for Writ of Certiorari).
61. Id. at 1949–50 (majority opinion).
62. Id. at 1951 (quoting First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 51, at 4–5,
17–18).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1952.
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already chosen to disregard the allegations averring Ashcroft’s and
Mueller’s discriminatory intent and their direct involvement in the
allegedly discriminatory policy, the result of the plausibility analysis was a
foregone conclusion: the majority held that Iqbal’s complaint did not
“contain any factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest petitioners’
discriminatory state of mind.”65
Justice Souter, who had authored the majority opinion in Twombly,
disagreed vehemently with the Iqbal majority’s approach to the plausibility
analysis.66 Specifically, he objected to the majority’s characterization of
allegations regarding discriminatory intent as mere legal conclusions. He
distinguished these allegations from the Twombly allegation asserting that
the defendant-service providers had conspired not to compete in each
others’ territories.67 Souter in Twombly had labeled the conspiracy
allegation a mere conclusion because it failed to define the time, place, or
scope of the conspiracy and because it failed to show any connection
between the alleged conspiracy and the defendants’ parallel conduct
described elsewhere in the complaint.68 In contrast, in Iqbal, Souter’s
dissent stressed that the complaint had alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller
“knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to
subject” [Iqbal] to a particular, discrete, discriminatory policy
detailed in the complaint. Iqbal does not say merely that
Ashcroft was the architect of some amorphous discrimination,
or that Mueller was instrumental in an ill-defined
constitutional violation; he alleges that they helped to create
the discriminatory policy he has described.69
As a result, Souter wrote that the Court was bound to accept the allegations
of discrimination as true for purposes of the 12(b)(6) motion and,
therefore, to conclude that the complaint had stated a claim.
Thus, the Iqbal majority had taken Twombly beyond its author’s
intentions. Specifically, in categorizing allegations as either factual
contentions or ignorable legal conclusions, the Iqbal majority had
interpreted the legal-conclusion category very broadly indeed—certainly
more broadly than Justice Souter had contemplated. The majority’s
application of Twombly in Iqbal thus makes 12(b)(6) dismissal a threat to
even more potentially meritorious lawsuits. This threat has generated not
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Stephen Breyer was the other Iqbal dissenter
who had been among the majority in Twombly. See id. at 1961 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1959–60 (Souter, J., dissenting).
68. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (noting that the complaint
failed to specify which service providers allegedly participated in an illegal agreement and when
and where the alleged agreement took place); id. at 556–57 (“Without more, parallel conduct does
not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does
not supply facts adequate to show illegality.”).
69. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting First Amended Complaint and
Jury Demand, supra note 51, at 17).
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only scholarly criticism70 but also Congressional hearings71 and proposed
federal legislation to undo the changes wrought by the two cases.72
III. A CLOSE READING OF IQBAL: ENTITLEMENT AND
DISENTITLEMENT, MEASURING AND JUDGING
Despite the arguably significant changes to established pleading law
wrought by both Twombly and Iqbal, their linguistic surfaces appear
relatively calm. A closer reading, however, shows that the text of the
majority opinion in Iqbal makes two revealing moves that couch the
Court’s plausibility analysis as a noncontroversial application of existing
pleading doctrine. First, Justice Kennedy’s references to “entitlement” and
related terms shift the analytical frame so that Iqbal’s argument against
dismissal appears as an inappropriate request for special treatment. Second,
the Iqbal opinion, like Twombly before it, relies on a judging-as-measuring
metaphor that associates the plausibility test with notions of consistency
and objectivity.
A. The Language of Entitlement as a Frame-Shifting Device
Any legally trained reader would expect the Court to mention the word
“entitlement” in a decision exploring the boundaries of Rule 8(a)(2). The
Rule, after all, requires pleaders to set forth “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”73 Similarly, one
would expect the term to turn up in cases where a government official
relies on the doctrine of qualified immunity, given that qualified immunity
is both a defense to liability and a limited “entitlement not to stand trial or
face the other burdens of litigation.”74
The majority opinion in Iqbal certainly refers to entitlement in these
straightforward contexts,75 but it also phrases its ruling against Iqbal as the
70. For scholarly criticism of Twombly, see supra note 44. For scholarly criticism of Iqbal,
see, e.g., Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited, supra note 7, at 867 (commenting that Iqbal’s
overall approach is “incoherent” and that its plausibility analysis is stricter than that of Twombly
and “not appropriate for many cases”); Burbank, supra note 7, at 115–16 (commenting that the
Iqbal majority wrought “mischief” by inconsistently choosing to ignore certain allegations, thereby
leaving open an “invitation to the lower courts to make ad hoc decisions, often reflecting buried
policy choices”). Professors Helen Hershkoff and Arthur Miller have asserted that Twombly and
Iqbal have precipitated a “‘contemporary crisis’ of rulemaking” through a “radical reinterpretation”
of Rules 8 and 12(b)(6). Helen Hershkoff & Arthur R. Miller, Celebrating Jack H. Friedenthal: The
Views of Two Co-authors, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9, 28 (2009).
71. See generally Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts? Before the S.
Comm.
on
the
Judiciary,
111th
Cong.
(2009)
(webcast
available
at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4189); Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v.
Iqbal Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (webcast available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_
091027_1.html).
72. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009).
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
74. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
75. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“When there are well-pleaded
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denial of an entitlement he has mistakenly assumed. According to the
majority, Iqbal “is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise,”76 and
he was wrong to “expect” his allegations of discriminatory intent to allow
his complaint to survive dismissal.77 These allegations are “not entitled to
the assumption of truth,”78 and Rule 8 “does not empower” Iqbal to change
that fact.79
This language accomplishes a shift in frame80 with respect to older
understandings of notice pleading. Traditional notice pleading
jurisprudence emphasized that defendants lacked entitlement to detailed
allegations at the pleading stage.81 By speaking instead in terms of the
plaintiff’s lack of entitlement—a lack of entitlement to proceed to litigation
absent a showing of a plausible claim—the Iqbal opinion reframes the
12(b)(6) picture. Specifically, this new use of the language of entitlement
transforms the plaintiff from someone who was generally presumed to
have a right to proceed to discovery into someone who is being
presumptuous and displaying an outsized sense of entitlement in even
requesting to proceed.
The subtlety of this frame-shift obscures the fact that the majority
opinion is actually implementing an enormous change in the law of federal
pleadings. Twombly’s plausibility test increased the level of detail
necessary to survive a motion to dismiss,82 and Iqbal’s implementation of
that test narrowed the set of allegations that could count as “factual” and
thus weigh in favor of plausibility.83 Nevertheless, the Court in both cases
insists that it is simply applying existing law.84 With respect to the Iqbal
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief.”); id. at 1953 (“Our rejection of the careful-case-management
approach is especially important in suits where Government-official defendants are entitled to assert
the defense of qualified immunity.”).
76. Id. at 1954.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1950; see also id. at 1951 (“We begin our analysis by identifying the allegations in
the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. . . . [T]he allegations are conclusory
and not entitled to be assumed true.”).
79. Id. at 1954.
80. See STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT 243 (2007) (providing numerous examples of
frame-shifting language and asserting that “[m]any disagreements in human affairs turn not on
differences in data or logic but on how a problem is framed”).
81. See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
84. The Twombly opinion asserts at several points that both its plausibility test and its
retirement of Conley’s “no set of facts” language comply with precedent. For example, it states that
any conflict between the majority’s analysis and Conley is merely “ostensible,” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560–61 (2007), and that the majority’s analysis “comports with this
Court’s statements in the years since Conley,” id. at 563 n.8. The opinion also indicates that its
plausibility test is consistent with precedent when it notes that the Twombly plaintiffs “do not, of
course, dispute the requirement of plausibility.” Id. at 560 (emphasis added). The Iqbal opinion, in
turn, emphasizes that its analysis is merely applying Twombly. Indeed, in Parts IV.A–B of the
opinion, where the majority applies Rule 8(a)(2) specifically to Iqbal’s complaint, the Court cites

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss4/4

14

Eichhorn: Sense of Disentitlement: Frame-Shifting and Metaphor in Ashcroft

2010]

FRAME-SHIFTING AND METAPHOR IN ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

965

opinion, Justice Kennedy’s deft use of the language of entitlement shifts
the frame so subtly that we hardly notice the significance of the
accompanying doctrinal change. Indeed, only once does the opinion’s
entitlement language inadvertently betray itself and indicate that a change
in the law has occurred: Justice Kennedy at one point explains that it is the
“conclusory nature” of Iqbal’s discrimination allegations that “disentitles
them to the presumption of truth.”85 Presumably, that which is now
“disentitled” was once entitled, even if the Iqbal majority insists it is only
implementing Twombly, and the Twombly majority insists it is only
applying the existing law.
Elsewhere in the Iqbal opinion, the entitlement frame-shift inspires
further language indicating that Iqbal is asking for special treatment in
opposing the motion to dismiss. For example, the entitlement frame-shift
no doubt underlies the majority’s characterization of Iqbal’s argument as
seeking “license” to “evade” the Rules’ pleading requirements.86 Once
again, Iqbal appears to be expecting indulgence. In reality, Iqbal had
argued not that he should be excused from having to comply with the
Rules but rather that his complaint did comply with the Rules. His
argument, as described at that point in the opinion, was based on Rule 9(b),
which allowed him to allege Ashcroft’s and Mueller’s discriminatory
motive “generally.”87 Iqbal’s interpretation of “generally” was consistent
with that of the Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz, which held that a similarly
general allegation of discriminatory motive was sufficient to state a
claim.88 Indeed, his position on this point was particularly compelling,
given that the Twombly Court had taken pains to explain that it was not
overruling Swierkiewicz.89 Thus, the majority characterizes Iqbal as
seeking “license” to get the Court to follow its own, recently reaffirmed
precedent.
Twombly twenty-two times. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–52.
85. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
86. Id. at 1954. The note of deception inherent in the word “evade” also echoes in the Court’s
statement that it need not assume the truth of “‘a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’”
Id. at 1950 (emphasis added) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
87. Id. at 1954 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)).
88. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002); see also supra notes 23–26 and
accompanying text.
89. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569–70. Despite the Court’s attempt to reconcile its decisions in
Twombly and Iqbal with Swierkiewicz, lower courts have split as to whether the two more recent
decisions have effectively overruled the earlier case. Compare Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We have to conclude . . . that because Conley has been specifically
repudiated by both Twombly and Iqbal, so too has Swierkiewicz, at least insofar as it concerns
pleading requirements and relies on Conley.”), with Gillman v. Inner City Broad. Corp., No. 08 Civ.
8909, 2009 WL 3003244, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009) (“Iqbal was not meant to displace
Swierkiewicz’s teachings about pleading standards for employment discrimination claims because in
Twombly, which heavily informed Iqbal, the Supreme Court explicitly affirmed the vitality of
Swierkiewicz.”). Within the Fourth Circuit, one district court has noted simply that “the impact of
Twombly and Iqbal on employment discrimination cases . . . is still unsettled.” Murchison v. Astrue,
No. 08-cv-02665-JFM, 2010 WL 46410, at *10, n.10 (D. Md. Jan. 6, 2010).
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And Iqbal’s argument is not just a special request for license; it is an
“invitation to relax the pleading requirements.”90 One can almost hear the
majority saying, “But if we relaxed the rules for you, we’d have to do it for
everybody.” Of course, whether rules are being “relaxed” or merely
“applied” is a matter of perspective. From Justice Souter’s perspective, the
Iqbal majority was neither relaxing Rule 8 nor applying it in a manner
consistent with Twombly.91 Instead, the Iqbal majority was increasing the
Rule’s requirements for Iqbal and all future civil plaintiffs. The status quo
ante can be described as “relaxed” only after this ratcheting occurs. Thus,
by labeling Iqbal’s argument as a request for relaxation of the pleading
requirements, the majority was able to obscure the fact that it was, indeed,
increasing those requirements.
The language of entitlement and of outsized expectations appears
elsewhere in the opinion as well. After labeling Iqbal’s direct allegations of
discrimination as conclusory, and thus setting them aside, the Court
identifies the remaining, factual allegations and notes that Iqbal “asks us to
infer” discrimination from them.92 These allegations stated merely that
Mueller’s FBI arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men after
September 11th and that Ashcroft and Mueller agreed to a policy of
holding high-interest detainees in highly restrictive conditions.93 The Court
held that these factual allegations did not give rise to a plausible inference
of discrimination on Ashcroft’s and Mueller’s parts, and that “[i]t should
come as no surprise” that a legitimate policy of arresting and detaining
those with suspected links to the September 11th tragedy would have a
disparate impact on Arab Muslims, given that the September 11th
perpetrators were themselves Arab Muslims.94 Thus, according to the
majority, Iqbal had “ask[ed]”95 the Court to draw an inference of
discrimination that ran counter to an “‘obvious alternative explanation.’”96
In fact, Iqbal had asked for no such inference at all. He had explicitly
alleged discriminatory intent on the part of Ashcroft and Mueller, rather
than leaving it to be inferred. It was only after the majority effectively
struck his direct allegations of discrimination that his argument morphed
into a seemingly unreasonable request for an inference. Once these
allegations were disregarded, the majority’s ruling on the plausibility of
discrimination may have been “no surprise,” but many have expressed
surprise that the Court chose to disregard the direct allegations of
discrimination in the first place.97
90. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953–54.
91. Id. at 1958–61 (Souter, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 1951–52 (majority opinion).
93. Id. at 1951 (citing First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 51, at 10).
94. Id. at 1951–52.
95. Id. at 1952.
96. Id. at 1951 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 555 U.S. 544, 567 (2007)).
97. See id. at 1960–61 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“By my lights, there is no principled basis for
the majority’s disregard of the allegations linking Ashcroft and Mueller to their subordinates’
discrimination.”). For scholarly commentary criticizing the majority’s disregard of Iqbal’s
allegations, see supra note 70.
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Lastly, the entitlement frame-shift appears to drive the opinion’s
characterization of Iqbal’s lawsuit as a “substantial diversion” for high
federal officials, who must instead spend their time executing the work of
the government in a time of national emergency.98 This characterization
may be apt in the context of the qualified immunity defense raised by
Ashcroft and Mueller and the post-September 11th backdrop of the case,
but it also sums up a more general hostility to litigation exhibited in both
Twombly and Iqbal. The Iqbal opinion goes on to note that litigation
through the discovery phase will exact “heavy costs in terms of efficiency
and expenditure of valuable time and resources” and that it is impossible
for a district court to manage discovery in a way that would effectively
minimize these costs.99 The Twombly majority mentioned a similar
justification for its ruling, noting that discovery in the potentially enormous
antitrust action would impose an extreme burden on the defendant-service
providers.100 Perhaps a Rule amendment could one day define a class of
large or complex cases to be subject to a pleading standard higher than that
of Rule 8(a)(2). However, by effectively imposing a higher standard
through judicial interpretation of Rule 8, the Court in Twombly and Iqbal
has ratcheted up the requirements for all civil plaintiffs, whatever the size
and nature of their claims. Even in actions where qualified immunity can
never come into play, the threatened continuation of a lawsuit to the
discovery phase has now become a “substantial diversion” that, absent a
showing of plausibility, a plaintiff is not entitled to create.
B. The Judging-as-Measuring Metaphor
In addition to using frame-shifting to cast Iqbal’s plausibility argument
in a particular light, the Iqbal opinion, like Twombly before it, relies on a
judging-as-measuring metaphor to reinforce the legitimacy of the
plausibility test itself. Theorists of metaphor have noted that humans often
speak of abstract concepts by relating them to more concrete and familiar
physical experiences.101 Thus, love might be spoken of as a journey, or
language might be compared to a container that holds ideas.102 Indeed,
people speak of ideas themselves as physical objects103 that can be “big” or
“heavy” or “deep.” In a similar vein, judging can be compared to
measuring—the act of using a ruler or a scale to determine the length or
98. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
99. Id.
100. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59.
101. See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 25 (1980) (“Our
experience of physical objects and substances provides a . . . basis for understanding . . . . Once we
can identify our experiences as entities or substances, we can refer to them, categorize them, group
them, and quantify them—and, by this means, reason about them.”); PINKER, supra note 80, at 237
(“[E]ven the airiest of our ideas are expressed . . . in thumpingly concrete metaphors.”).
102. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 101, at 11–12 (discussing the metaphor that linguistic
expressions are containers for meaning); id. at 85 (discussing metaphors regarding love, including
the metaphor that love is a journey); PINKER, supra note 80, at 240 (listing variations of the love-isa-journey metaphor).
103. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 101, at 10–11.
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weight of a given idea or argument.
Metaphors like those above have been called conceptual metaphors,
because they suggest a particular conception of their targets (whether love,
or language, or ideas, or judging) that can generate families of related
metaphors, tropes, and images.104 For example, if love is a journey, one
might speak of a relationship that has stalled, or encountered bumps in the
road, or arrived at a crossroad.105 In the case of the Iqbal decision, the
implicit conceptual metaphor of judging-as-measuring spurs two more
specific metaphors to which the text of the opinion repeatedly refers: the
first posits Iqbal’s allegations as physical objects whose mass can be
determined, and the second posits them as physical forces that may or may
not propel his claim across a fixed line between possibility and plausibility.
Both of these images associate the plausibility analysis with notions of
consistency and objectivity, while obscuring the fact that Iqbal entrusts the
plausibility question not to yardsticks and scales, but to a judge’s “judicial
experience and common sense.”106
1. Allegations as Having Mass
The Iqbal majority’s text frequently refers to the complaint’s
allegations as lacking sufficient mass or physical substance to state a
plausible claim. For example, the opinion begins by noting that “‘naked
assertion[s]’”107 and “[t]hreadbare recitals” of elements108 are insufficient.
These images recall Twombly’s reference to “the threshold requirement of
Rule 8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft” to show
entitlement to relief.109 Further, the Iqbal opinion notes that a complaint’s
allegations must register more than a “sheer possibility” that the defendant
may be liable.110 In addition, in setting aside Iqbal’s direct allegations of
discrimination, the Court refers to them as “bare” assertions that therefore
add nothing of substance to the plausibility determination.111 The opinion
refers to legal conclusions as providing an empty “framework” that lacks
the substance to state a claim unless that framework is supported with
factual allegations.112
The word choices above give the persuasive force of Iqbal’s allegations
a measurable physicality. One need only view and weigh the allegations to
determine whether they are sheer or hefty, bare frameworks or massive
reinforced structures. Thus, the plausibility analysis is reduced to a
physical process of observing and measuring mass, and the results of this
process will be reassuringly consistent and seemingly objective. In this
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

PINKER, supra note 80, at 240.
Id.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
Id. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
Id.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Id. at 1951.
Id. at 1950.
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way, the mass-related images hide the breadth of discretion Iqbal grants to
judges applying the plausibility test.113 Additionally, it is worth noting that
several of the adjectives the Court uses to describe lack of mass—“naked,”
“threadbare,” and “bare”—also refer to lack of clothing. These choices
evoke the revelation from the fairy tale that the emperor has no clothes. In
so doing, they reinforce the idea that Iqbal, like the emperor, has
unreasonable expectations regarding the reception to which his
presentation is entitled.
2. Allegations as Crossing a Line
In describing the plausibility analysis, both the Twombly and Iqbal
opinions speak in terms of a fixed line separating the merely possible from
the plausible. For example, the Twombly opinion, later quoted in Iqbal,
describes a complaint whose insufficient allegations cause the pleading to
“stop[] short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitle[ment] to relief.’”114 Similarly, the Iqbal majority, quoting
Twombly, explains that dismissal of the complaint is warranted because
Iqbal’s allegations have not “‘nudg[ed]’ his claim of purposeful
discrimination ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’”115 This
emphasis on a fixed line allows both opinions to indicate that they are not
increasing the showing required to state a claim; the line between stating a
claim and not doing so is still fixed in the same location where it has
always been, and the pre-Twombly requirements for stating a claim
therefore remain the same. This line image also indicates that it is possible
to differentiate consistently between the possible and the plausible; one
need only look to see whether the allegations have crossed some agreedupon, fixed boundary.
The line image, of course, obscures as much as it clarifies. As explained
above, rather than measuring the plaintiffs’ complaints against some
eternally fixed line, Twombly and Iqbal each appear to have drawn new
lines by increasing the level of detail required for allegations to state a
claim. Thus, “the line” is not a pre-existing boundary against which
allegations may be measured; instead, it is the product of an individual
court’s exercise of its own discretion in deciding whether a given
complaint plausibly suggests a right to relief. It is an individually
determined outcome rather than an external aid to arriving at an outcome.
Further, the line metaphor serves to obscure the slippery nature of the
“judicial experience and common sense” that Iqbal instructs courts to use
when determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim.116 As
Professor Steven Burbank has noted, “[j]udgments about the plausibility of
a complaint are necessarily comparative” and depend on “a judge’s
background knowledge and assumptions, which seem every bit as
113.
114.
1949.
115.
116.

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)), quoted in Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Id. at 1950.
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vulnerable to the biasing effect of that individual’s cultural predispositions
as are judgments about adjudicative facts.”117
IV. WHY FRAMES AND METAPHORS IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS MATTER
In a January 2010 town hall meeting, South Carolina Lieutenant
Governor Andre Bauer used the following words to explain his position
that the government should be more active in holding accountable those
whose families receive public assistance such as free or reduced-price
school lunches:
My grandmother . . . told me as a small child to quit feeding
stray animals. You know why? Because they breed. You’re
facilitating the problem if you give an animal or a person
ample food supply. They will reproduce, especially ones that
don’t think too much further than that. And so what you’ve
got to do is you’ve got to curtail that type of behavior. They
don’t know any better.118
While the Lieutenant Governor shortly thereafter told reporters he
regretted the remarks,119 reaction to the way in which his words had framed
the debate was voluminous.120 The volume and fervor of the response
indicates that people sense inherently that metaphors and other framing
devices have power to guide thoughts and actions—and that the frames and
metaphors adopted by government decision makers can therefore have
significant practical consequences.121
117. Burbank, supra note 7, at 118.
118. Nathaniel Cary, Bauer: Needy ‘Owe Something Back’ for Aid, THE STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Jan. 23, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.thestate.com/local/v-print/story/1123844.html.
119. Roddie Burris, Bauer Regrets Stray Remarks, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 26, 2010,
at A1, available at http://www.thestate.com/2010/01/26/v-print/1127678.html. A linguistic analysis
of Bauer’s explanation that he regretted the remark specifically because “now it’s being used as an
analogy, not a metaphor,” id., is beyond the scope of this Article.
120. Within the state of South Carolina, letters to the editor regarding the stray-animal
metaphor continued to appear in newspapers even two weeks after the speech. See, e.g., Vince
Ward, Letter to the Editor, Bauer Reveals Much with Animal Comment, THE STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Feb. 5, 2010, available at http://www.thestate.com/letters/v-print/story/1142447.html. In all,
The State newspaper in Columbia, South Carolina, received well over 100 letters in response to
Bauer’s comments, and this number “far and away dwarfs the number of letters typically received
regarding a state or local issue.” Telephone Interview with Claudia Raby, Letters to the Editor
Dep’t, The State (Feb. 15, 2010). Reaction outside the state was voluminous as well. My Google
search of the words “Andre Bauer stray animals” on Feb. 9, 2010, retrieved over 450,000 entries. A
New York Times editorial, published a few days after the remarks were made, condemned the
metaphor but noted that it had “at least stirred an encouraging furor.” Editorial, So It’s Granny’s
Fault?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2010, at A32, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/opi
nion/28thu3.html.
121. Donald A. Schön has insightfully described the role that metaphorical frames play in the
setting of social policy. See Donald A. Schön, Generative Metaphor: A Perspective on ProblemSetting in Social Policy, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 137, 143–50 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed.
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Theorists in several fields have attested to the persuasive power of
metaphor and its relation to human cognition. Linguist George Lakoff and
philosopher Mark Johnson have famously argued that human thought
processes are largely metaphorical122 and that metaphors can create reality
in the sense that they structure the way in which people perceive their
experiences in the world.123 According to these two theorists, once a
person accepts a specific metaphor, that metaphor may guide the person’s
actions, and those “actions will, of course, fit the metaphor,” turning the
metaphor into a “self-fulfilling prophec[y].”124
Cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker has posited a more moderate
approach, asserting that while “conceptual metaphor really does have
profound implications for the understanding of language and thought,”125
humans “can’t think with a metaphor alone.”126 Pinker nevertheless
acknowledges that metaphors “are not just literary garnishes but aids to
reason [that] can power sophisticated inferences.”127 In the legal context,
theorist Steven L. Winter has noted that a metaphor “colors and controls
our subsequent thinking about its subject” and “enables us to see systems
of analogies not previously recognized.”128 He has argued that some of the
most forceful metaphors in American jurisprudence, such as the
envisioning of free speech as “a marketplace of ideas,” did not spring freeform from their authors’ pens but instead arose from the combination of
existing conceptual metaphors (such as the ideas-are-objects metaphor) and
societal changes (such as the rise of laissez-faire capitalism) that for the
first time enabled a particular comparison to carry revelatory and
persuasive force.129
Under any theory, metaphors operate by highlighting points of
experienced similarity between a source concept, such as a journey, and a
target concept, such as love.130 In so doing, of course, they also hide or
suppress attributes of the target that do not correspond to any attributes of
the source.131 For example, the metaphor of labor-as-resource highlights
that labor can be quantified (in terms of hours worked) and that it can be
assigned a value, but the metaphor suppresses notions concerning who is

1993) (using the urban renewal movement of the 1960s as a case study).
122. See generally LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 101 (arguing that all cognition except the
most fundamental thinking regarding primary physical experiences is metaphorical).
123. Id. at 144–46.
124. Id. at 156.
125. PINKER, supra note 80, at 247.
126. Id. at 251.
127. Id. at 253.
128. Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1383 (1988).
129. See WINTER, supra note 1, at 271–73.
130. See Winter, supra note 128, at 1383–84 (explaining that a metaphor “carrie[s] over”
attributes of the source and applies them to the target).
131. Id. at 1386–87 (explaining that metaphor hides dissimilarities between a target and a
source, reducing these dissimilarities to “a species of epistemic ‘noise’”) (internal citation omitted).
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performing the labor and how meaningful it is to him or her.132And it is
from this highlighting of some ideas and the suppressing of others that
metaphors draw their persuasive force.133
In the context of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, we do not ordinarily think of the
Supreme Court as needing to use metaphor and framing to persuade an
audience of the correctness of a decision it has issued. The Court, after all,
is the final authority. However, Steven L. Winter has perceptively argued
that “the higher the court, the larger the audience that must be
persuaded”134 because in Western societies, where “‘law’ is synonymous
with objective delineations of right and wrong . . . a court can produce that
automatic, tacit sense of validity only if its judgments conform with the
most conventional values of the culture.”135
In the Iqbal majority opinion, the entitlement frame-shift described in
Part III persuades, subtly, by highlighting the risk that, if Rule 8(a)(2) is
interpreted loosely, an “unentitled” plaintiff with a non-meritorious claim
will impose upon a defendant the burdens of discovery. Of course, the
frame-shift simultaneously and persuasively suppresses the risk that, under
the plausibility test, some plaintiffs with meritorious claims will
experience dismissal simply because they lack access to detailed evidence
at the pleading stage. The judging-as-measuring metaphor buttresses this
persuasive effect by offering assurance that judges can make consistent and
objective decisions regarding who is and is not entitled to proceed to
discovery.
To the extent that 20th Century notice-pleading jurisprudence
emphasized the entitlement of a plaintiff to proceed to discovery upon
providing fair notice,136 perhaps the entitlement frame-shift, with its
characterization of a plaintiff as having an outsized sense of entitlement,
was a predictable 21st Century rejoinder to that jurisprudence, given the
growing perception that the Federal Rules discovery process had grown
significantly more burdensome in the intervening years.137 In highlighting
this burden, the frame-shift is seductive. The judging-as-measuring
metaphor is equally seductive to a society that longs to equate judicial

132. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 101, at 65–68.
133. Winter, supra note 128, at 1387 (explaining how, through highlighting and suppressing
certain aspects of a target concept, a metaphor can come to be recognized as representing the truth
about the target).
134. WINTER, supra note 1, at 322.
135. Id. at 323.
136. See supra notes 8–18 and accompanying text.
137. Bryant Garth in 1998 noted that while empirical studies showed that the discovery
process worked reasonably efficiently in the great majority of cases, discovery in the much smaller
group of complex, high-stakes cases was characterized by “dissatisfaction, delay and expense.”
Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and Delay to the Markets in
Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 597, 605 (1998). Because the lawyers handling
these complex cases were often prosperous and prominent, they tended to have a greater voice at
conferences and on committees examining issues of civil discovery, and their experiences of
“enormous problems” with discovery tended to dominate the debate. Id.
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decisionmaking with objectivity.138 However, the important question is not
whether the frames and metaphors seduce but whether they have led to a
decision that comports with the foundational assumptions underlying the
Federal Rules. In Part III of this Article, I join others139 who have argued
that the decision has changed the law in a way that does not comport with
these assumptions.
Both the frame-shift and the judging-as-measuring metaphor that
support Iqbal’s plausibility analysis are now linguistically and conceptually
embedded in precedent. Given stare decisis and the generative power of
conceptual metaphor, they will replicate themselves and spawn related
tropes in lower court opinions, becoming even further embedded in 21stCentury pleadings jurisprudence. However, the frames and metaphors of
Iqbal need not block any reform efforts aimed at the Rules Advisory
Committee and Congress. Although frames and metaphors have power,
they do not control us absolutely: “People certainly are affected by
framing . . . . And metaphors, especially conceptual metaphors, are an
essential tool of . . . thought itself. But this doesn’t mean that people are
enslaved by their metaphors . . . . Like other generalizations, metaphors can
be tested on their predictions and scrutinized on their merits . . . .”140
Indeed, it is only by actively noticing what metaphors highlight and
suppress that true critical inquiry of an issue can begin.141 Thus, an
important first step for reformers, post-Iqbal, is to engage the Rules
Advisory Committee and Congress in true critical inquiry by explaining
what the Iqbal decision hides. The Justices were not well-positioned to
engage in such critical inquiry—an inquiry that should take account of
recent empirical research regarding discovery costs and that should be
informed by those with a broad base of experience in federal trial court
litigation.142
Thus, it is only by persuading the Rules Advisory Committee to step
back from the seductive frames and metaphors of Iqbal that reformers may
inspire a more appropriate inquiry into pleadings jurisprudence to begin—
an inquiry that could bring federal pleading practice back into line with the
foundational principles of the Federal Rules.

138. See WINTER, supra note 1, at 323 (asserting that in Western societies, law “is synonymous
with objective delineations of right and wrong”).
139. See supra note 70.
140. PINKER, supra note 80, at 261.
141. See Schön, supra note 121, at 150 (explaining that “critical inquiry” becomes possible
only when people engage in “awareness and reflection” regarding existing conceptual, or
generative, metaphors).
142. See Burbank, supra note 7, at 116 (critiquing Twombly and Iqbal and noting that the
policy questions in those cases were not appropriate for judicial determination); Access to Justice
Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 27 (2009) (statement of Arthur
Miller, University Professor, New York Univ. School of Law) (“With Twombly and Iqbal, the
Court may have forsaken [its] commitment [to the rulemaking and legislative processes] by
reformulating the Rules’ pleading and motion to dismiss standards by judicial fiat.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
After having imposed a plausibility test on pleadings in Twombly, the
Supreme Court has further increased the requirements for pleadings to state
a claim in its recent Iqbal decision. This change in pleading standards,
which affects access to justice in all civil cases, is all the more remarkable
given the Court’s insistence that it has not changed those standards at all.
In the text of the majority opinion in Iqbal, frame-shifting and metaphor
downplay the substantive shift in the law, reinforcing the notion that the
Court’s analysis is simply a fair and consistent application of precedent,
rather than a usurpation of the Congressional power to change the Federal
Rules.
Specifically, by framing the Rule 12(b)(6) issue in terms of a plaintiff’s
lack of entitlement to proceed to discovery, the Court de-emphasizes its
abandonment of fifty years of notice-pleading jurisprudence, which
emphasized the defendant’s lack of entitlement to detailed allegations at
the pleading stage. This frame-shift is accompanied by a judging-asmeasuring metaphor that offers reassurance regarding the possibility of
consistent, objective decisions regarding which plaintiffs are indeed
entitled to survive early dismissal. Because frame-shifting and metaphor
both reflect and guide cognitive processes, reformers seeking to reverse
these recent changes to pleading jurisprudence will succeed only if they
can enable Congress and the Rules Advisory Committee to step back from
the frame and metaphor imposed by Iqbal to consider, more fully and
critically, whether the changes wrought by both Twombly and Iqbal truly
align with the fundamental principles underlying the Federal Rules.
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